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5IS “NONTHEIST QUAKERISM”  
A CONTRADICTION OF TERMS?
Paul anderson
Is the term “Nontheist Friends” a contradiction of terms? On one hand, Friends have been free-thinking and open theologically, so 
liberal Friends have tended to welcome almost any nonconventional 
trend among their members. As a result, atheists and nontheists have 
felt a welcome among them, and some Friends in Britain and Friends 
General Conference have recently explored alternatives to theism. On 
the other hand, what does it mean to be a “Quaker”—even among 
liberal Friends? Can an atheist claim with integrity to be a “birthright 
Friend” if one has abandoned faith in the God, when the historic heart 
and soul of the Quaker movement has diminished all else in service to 
a dynamic relationship with the Living God? And, can a true nontheist 
claim to be a “convinced Friend” if one declares being unconvinced of 
God’s truth? On the surface it appears that one cannot have it both 
ways. One cannot by definition be an “unconvinced Quaker,” and 
one cannot claim a “birthright” while declaring also from its central 
tenets—either for potage or more substantive gain.
So, what are Quakers to do about a group that advertises themselves 
as “Nontheist Friends”? Is this a case of liberal Friends going too far, 
threatening to cut themselves off not only from their spiritual heritage 
but also from the rest of the global Quaker movement? They are 
certainly welcome to do so, but can they retain the names “Quaker” 
or “Friend” with integrity, or must these historic and theological 
terms be ceded to others if one truly becomes a nontheist? 
Belief in “no God” amonG modern skePtics
Of course, the propounding of skepticism and atheism is ubiquitous 
in the modern era, so these discussions among Friends are not unique. 
Apparent in recent critiques of belief in God, however, some have also 
come to advocate an obverse “belief in No God” as a tenet of faith. 
Therefore, unlike the mere questioning of religious belief in God, 
declaring belief in “No God”—and religiously so—inevitably inherits 
the same liabilities of theistic religion and theology. The question is 
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how adequate such a stance is, and whether nontheism as a religion 
and counter-faith is a good thing, intellectually or otherwise. 
Nearly four years ago I enrolled as an academic member of the 
National Newswriter’s Association and attended their national 
meetings held that year in Washington D.C. hoping to see how 
religion journalists were covering religious issues in America. An 
interesting session was held on “We Believe in No God, and You 
Shouldn’t Either,” featuring Jennifer Michael Hecht (author of 
Doubt: A History), Barry Kosmin (director, Institute for the Study of 
Secularism in Society and Culture), and Paul Kurtz (founder, Center 
for Inquiry). The presentations were engaging, as arguments for 
secularism and atheism were propounded despite statistics showing 
that over 96% of people in America believed in some sort of God or 
divine being. 
I found myself, however, drawn into the fray during the discussion, 
standing in line waiting to ask my questions of the panelists because 
some of their work was terribly problematic intellectually. Hecht’s 
presentation was especially inadequate; she argued in favor of atheism 
citing such luminaries as Plato, Aquinas, and Jefferson being “on 
our side” and disparaged all references to Jewish-Christian scriptures 
as solely “religious” and therefore irrelevant to anthropological or 
sociological fields of scientific inquiry. As a biblical scholar, I pointed 
out that most critical biblical scholarship in the modern era is done 
scientifically (after all, my first book was published in Tübingen’s 
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neues Testament series—
the Scientific Investigation of the New Testament) with interests in 
anthropology, sociology, economics, politics, rhetoric, psychology, 
and virtually every other field of academic inquiry; so, marginalizing 
all biblical references as religious-only, and thus irrelevant to other 
fields of inquiry, betrays one’s dismal ignorance of a longstanding 
academic field—an object of her critique.
While such a sweeping lacuna by a public scholar may be 
contextualized—though not excused—by noting that Hecht was 
referencing a field outside of her primary knowledge base, citing 
Plato, Aquinas, and Jefferson as allies of atheism or nontheism is 
intellectually incomprehensible. Plato argued for one God—the source 
of ideal truth, goodness and beauty, against the many lesser “gods”—
projections of human investments and loyalties and declared himself 
“guilty” of the charge of seeking to corrupt the youth of his day away 
from their materialism toward a higher and transcendent understanding 
is “nontheist quakerism” a contradiction of terms? • 7
of truth and its implications for living. Aquinas unquestioningly was 
the greatest Christian theologian between Augustine and Luther, and 
while his disputatio method of inquiry was indeed analytical, to say 
he did not believe in God is laughable. His five-fold proof of the 
existence of God might not be equally compelling in all respects, 
but just because he advocated critical questioning does not mean he 
disavowed theism. Jefferson was a deist, not an atheist. He believed 
in God but held that God’s work in the world was limited to natural 
means rather than supernatural ones. Further, he professed against 
critics to be an authentic Christian and in his later years cut and pasted 
the sayings of Jesus in a folio by which to direct his life; he believed in 
Jesus’ teachings and took them to heart. 
What surprised me about Hecht’s presentation is that such a set 
of intellectually inexcusable statements could be made by someone 
arguing for intellectual advance and acuity. This seemed to me a public 
display of intellectual shoddiness at best—intellectual dishonesty at 
worst. Then again, I may have misunderstood her argument. If she 
was connecting “a history of doubt” to consequential “atheism,” in 
opposition to “a history of faith” and “theism,” that might account for 
her merging of categories with undue fluidity, but not all skepticism 
leads to atheism or reflects it. So, clarifying what is meant by doubt 
and belief, let alone theism, atheism, nontheism, and other terms, is 
essential to the larger discussion.
Godless for God’s sake?
In 2006 a book was published featuring the essays of 27 Quakers 
claiming to be part of a movement referring to itself as Quaker atheists 
and nontheists.1 As several discussions of atheism, nontheism, and 
alternatives to theism had been conducted among British and North 
American Friends, this book and its attending website attempt to 
forge a movement among Friends challenging not only traditional and 
biblical views of God and the spiritual life, but also the very question 
of God itself, asking if Friends might be better off liberated from the 
restraints of assuming God exists and is active in the world. Citing 
a parallel from an Indian doctor regarding a picture of Ganesh, the 
Hindu god with the head of an elephant, David Boulton quotes him 
as saying, “I believe, trust and have complete confidence in every 
attribute of Ganesh—except his existence” (p. 13). By extension, 
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Boulton argues for embracing the attributes of God (love in action) 
independent from believing in God’s existence. 
The collection features ten essays seeking to build a case for Quaker 
nontheism (a softer form of atheism, although several contributors 
do claim to be atheists) and nineteen testimonials. Most of the 
contributors believed in some sort of spiritual reality we might term as 
“God” but had problems with particular descriptions of that reality. If 
that is indeed the case, I’m not sure they should see themselves as strict 
atheists or nontheists; they are actually doing theology. The question is 
how well they are doing theology; is it adequate or impoverished? One 
of the things I noticed is that while such Anglican nontheists as Don 
Cupitt and Shelby Spong are cited among some of the writers, and 
while Paul Tillich is mentioned some, the great theologians of recent 
decades, such as Karl Barth, John Zizioulas, Hans Küng, Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Karl Rahner, Nancey Murphy, and Jürgen Moltmann 
are absent from the discussions. This makes one wonder if streams of 
influence are a bit on the shallow side, intellectually.
I also question the presentation of statistics; while one survey 
purports that a quarter of British Friends surveyed disbelieved or had 
some doubts about whether God existed (7% answering “no” and 
19% answering “not sure,” pp. 102-103), another question in the 
survey notes that 98% of British Friends listed “There is that of God 
in everyone” as “very/quite important” (p. 109)—the highest score 
among all theological tenets. If nearly all British Friends value highly 
the appeal of George Fox to “that of God” within every person, do 
a quarter of them really believe in No God? And, the highest value 
among Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Friends surveyed in 2004 (78%) 
was “For me, Meeting for Worship is a time to listen for God” (p. 
109). Therefore, if “listening for God” in meetings for worship 
scored highest on the list of convictions for Philadelphia Yearly 
Meeting Friends, this suggests a strong interest in attending and living 
responsively to the Divine—however one understands that reality. 
Reviews of the book were quite negative in The Friend and Friends 
Journal, although responses to the reviews were mixed. Tony Stoller2 
asks whether we should “seek out a sense of belonging and goodness 
which is apart from God, indeed which denies the existence of God 
as anything much more than a rather anachronistic myth” or whether 
we should “resoundingly re-affirm that we are indeed theists, that we 
believe in and strive to know a theological God, that we are consciously 
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the Religious Society of Friends. If we are unable or unwilling to 
return God’s embrace, then what in the end is the point of being a 
Quaker?” Initial positive responses to Stoller’s critique include Diana 
Lampen’s questioning the statistics (given that belief and unbelief 
are on a continuum), Chris Barber’s affirming the reality of God 
whatever one calls it, and Joseph Gamblin’s suggestion that seeking 
a relationship with God is “an excellent guide for Meetings when 
considering future applications for membership.” Initial negative 
responses include Paul Holdworth’s being less bothered by asking 
hard questions than the certainty of some theists and David Boulton’s 
appreciation-yet-clarification that the contemporary question is not 
God’s existence, but what is meant by those speaking about “God” 
or “the Spirit.” Boulton then queries whether “compassion in action” 
might be a good way to describe that reality we refer to as “God”—
also as a means of returning “the divine embrace.”3 
Marty Grundy’s review in Friends Journal (November 2006, pp. 
25-26) was more programmatic in its critique. Noting that not all the 
contributors to this book were happy with the label “nontheist,” as 
they also exhibited a good deal of diversity rather than coherence, she 
claims Boulton’s opening reference to Meister Eckhart is misleading: 
Eckhart “was not saying the best thing is to discard God, but rather to 
lay aside our fondest ideas, definitions, and expectations about God, 
to step into the void and in the unknowing find the Presence.”4 More 
pointedly, Grundy questions why a movement so directly opposed to 
Quaker faith and practice should be welcomed among Friends, noting 
the following problems:
•  If foundational convictions of early Friends included such 
testimonies as “Christ is come to teach his people himself,” 
“the power of the Lord is over all,” and “the Lord did 
gather us up as in a net,” then denying “the experiential 
availability of the Living God” goes against these central 
Quaker beliefs.
•  Dismissing “by fiat Quaker understandings of Truth” the 
approach of the book is based on several unquestioned 
assumptions: only what is apprehended through the senses, 
only what is inside one’s own head or experience, only that 
which can be comprehended by human intellect is “real.”
•  While experience is repeatedly asserted to be the 
contributors’ only measure of truth, “they have deliberately 
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chosen to emasculate their own experience and to 
misinterpret that of others.” This includes denying the 
religious experiences of Quaker founders as well as Quaker 
contemporaries who testify to having had transformative 
encounters with God.
•	  “Does this book prove the difficult negative that God 
does not exist? No. Does it prove that the contributors’ 
varying interpretations of nontheistic humanism belong 
in the Religious Society of Friends? No. Ignorance of, 
or misuse or misappropriation of language, image, and 
metaphor does not change the reality of the matrix within 
which these symbols are embedded, and toward which they 
point.”
•	  While the essayists emphasize the importance of action, 
they neglect the spiritual origin of Quaker praxis, raising 
the question as to whether today’s Friends have neglected 
central components of membership, which involves 
understanding how central components of Friends worship, 
community, and social action are rooted in the theology 
and experience of “primitive Christianity revived.”
Responses to Grundy’s critique were mostly negative, although Philip 
Hunt is taken with her invitation to be shown experiential proof of 
the belief that God does not exist.5 Loomis Mayer notes that Christ 
can be known as a figure of history if not as a supernatural deity; Chris 
Knight wonders if this is postmodern Quakerism, even if essays might 
not speak to “our” condition; Harriet Heath asks whether our belief 
in continuing revelation might allow us to welcome those who do 
not share our beliefs in God.6 Elizabeth Willey asks if we are not all 
seeking God’s truth whatever we call it; Rosemary K. Coffey asks what 
we will profit from exclusion; Susan Furry asks whether “recognizing 
that of God in each other” challenges Grundy’s query as to whether 
“Friends have become so ‘sloppy’ in membership procedures that we 
have accepted people who don’t belong.” She testifies to having been 
an atheist but upon experiencing “that secret power” in the meeting 
for worship that Robert Barclay described—weakening the evil and 
raising up the good within—things changed personally.7 Then again, 
such an experience with the numinous seems more like a movement 
from atheism to Quakerism, leaving the former behind, rather than a 
viable merging of the two. 
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Chuck Fager’s review in Quaker Theology, however, was not 
only positive; it was laudatory:8 “What have we come to in Friends 
religious thought, when the most exciting book of Quaker theology 
I’ve read in years is produced by a bunch of Quaker non-theists–
twenty-seven in all?” Fager even describes his appreciation as a Quaker 
theist (“or perhaps more accurately a failed non-theist”). Rather than 
being scandalized by asking tough questions of God, Fager notes the 
biblical precedent of Job, described as “perhaps the earliest biblical 
theological treatise.” Indeed, biblical Job’s situation challenges 
theological understandings of God’s justice, love, and power, as 
contemporary inquiries about God also do. Fager traces “the long 
pedigree of religious non-theism” within American Quakerism to 
Lucretia Mott 160 years ago and references an “apostolic succession” 
of Quaker non-theists ever since.9 He then attacks quite severely 
Marty Grundy’s review, calling it “distressing, even a bit shocking” 
for ones like her to be “wringing hands and reeling aghast at the 
infiltration of infidels into their orthodox sanctuary, and calling for 
a purge to clear up the Society’s ranks.” Fager concludes with citing 
Jesus’ measure of faithfulness, “by their fruits ye shall know them,” 
and claims that because such is so, “nontheist Friends have as much 
claim to a legitimate place in contemporary Quakerism as many who 
feel they are defending the last true redoubt against the invading 
forces of unbelief.” 
Among these reviews, the major concern is whether atheism and 
nontheism go against the central Quaker ethos, which prioritizes the 
seeking and responding to the inward workings of the Living God. Of 
course, attempts to define the Infinite and to comprehend the Ultimate 
are beyond capacities of human means and constructs (religion and 
theology), but the religious quest as a spiritual endeavor to encounter 
and be directed by an immanent Divine Being has been the central 
thrust of the Jewish-Christian faith for millennia, and Friends have 
felt called to be radically devoted to faithful responsiveness within 
the human-divine relationship. If, as Boulton and others claim, 
there is no Divine Other, and what we conceive as “God” is merely 
(not just somewhat) a projection of human imaginations, this is 
categorically different from historic and authentic Quakerism, by any 
measure. Denying the central thrust of the historic Quaker quest—a 
transformative relationship with the Living God—is far different from 
missing a plank or two in the larger party platform.
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straiGhteninG out the lanGuaGe about theism 
and its alternatives
The first imperative in exploring alternatives to theism is to straighten 
out the language, as discussions of theism and nontheism reside within 
a field of reasoned inquiry: theology. Of course, any approach to doing 
theology, seeking to understand its central subject—theos (God)—is 
fraught with challenges. How is the invisible realm of the Divine, the 
Absolute, the Transcendent, the Ultimate to be apprehended by finite 
humans? Is there one god or many? How do we know that God exists, 
or not; and, what is meant by “existence”?10 Does humankind have 
a source, and if so, is the Ground and Source of our Being personal, 
loving, just, and true, or have humans risen above their originative 
source? Did life flow from nonlife? To affirm the reality of God in any 
sense, however, does not explain what God is like or how to relate to 
God. That’s what theology also does, providing understandings also 
of the human-divine relationship.
The map is not the territory, and yet maps are also helpful in 
navigating the terrain. Central theological problems address issues of 
what we think of God’s being all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing 
(omniscient), and all-loving (omnibenevolent) given the fact of human 
suffering and apparent evil. This evokes the problem of theodicy (the 
justice of God). How could a just, able, and loving God allow tragedy 
and devastation in the world? Either God is unjust (either cruel or 
unfair), inept (either unknowing or unable), or unloving (and thus 
unworthy of conscientious respect). Ways theologians have addressed 
these classic issues, especially in post-Holocaust, post-colonial, and 
post-modern perspective, include limiting God’s activity (God acts 
spiritually rather than physically), challenging the finality of loss 
(finding meaning or even benefit in suffering), noting obstacles 
to God’s sovereign action (personified evil, human disobedience, 
natural disasters), or rejecting the notion of God altogether or at least 
somewhat (approaches of atheism and nontheism). 
Of course, every approach has its own strengths and weaknesses, 
so the rich history of theological debates about God over three or 
more millennia poses an important basis for addressing these issues 
thoughtfully. Unfortunately for Friends, however, the fact that we 
have neglected second-order reflection (the map) in favor of first-
order encounter (the territory) means that while many Friends are 
quite intellectually advanced in any number of fields, we are all 
too often intellectually impoverished when it comes to theological 
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discussions.11 At times those intrigued with nontheism unwittingly 
reject entire subjects of study without being aware of alternatives to 
particular theological problems. They simply do not know the history 
of inquiry; at times they do not care. Therefore, understanding the 
larger issues and discussions, as well as the meanings of particular 
terms, is important if Friends wish to engage meaningfully in debates 
about the character and existence of God. Following are some basic 
ways of understanding some of the terms bandied about—at other 
times sidestepped—within these larger discussions.
Theism—the belief in a divine being, lending itself to a variety 
of views related to God’s involvement with humanity, the 
meaning of life, moral normativity, and the origin and character 
of the natural realm. If the cosmos has an origin, if there are 
elements of design in natural and material realms, if personhood 
has a source, if there is that than which nothing greater can be 
conceived, affirmative answers to these questions point to God. 
Many types of theism abound, often emerging as factors of how 
one deals with various inferences about God and the world.
Deterministic Theism—the belief that because God is all knowing 
and all powerful God controls what happens in the world. In 
some destinarian systems, God elects the saved and the damned; 
therefore, one must accept one’s fate and infer God’s sovereign 
hand in whatever comes in life. Because one’s salvation is not 
dependent on what one does, some once-saved-always-saved 
approaches diminish the role of human responsibility and moral 
choices.
Open Theism—the view that God is sovereign and all powerful, 
yet God limits Godself to the choices that humans make because 
of God’s love for humanity and honoring of persons’ autonomy. 
As a result, history is a factor of human choices and actions, and 
because God is personal and responsive to prayer, humans play 
a role in the unfolding of God’s redemptive work in the world.
Process Theism—the view that God is dynamic and becoming 
rather than unchanging and static. If human and other 
organisms, in their development and processive movement 
toward actualization, reflect the character of their maker, an 
improvement over classical theism sees God’s perfection as a 
factor of processive interactivity with humans and their choices. 
Therefore, humans are involved in the unfolding history of 
God’s will as a factor of the human-divine relationship.
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Monotheism—the belief that there is only one God and that such 
a Being calls humans into a covenantal relationship involving 
stipulations for humans and consequences wrought by God. 
In Hebrew Scripture’s presentation of a conditional covenant, 
where God’s people obey God’s laws blessing results; where they 
disobey adversity follows. Unconditional covenants in Scripture 
also show God’s gracious bestowal of blessing regardless of 
human merit.
Polytheism—the belief in multiple gods, often in conflict 
with each other, reinforced by mythic narratives of one deity 
conquering competitors. In ancient times, the victory of 
one party over others was interpreted as a victory within the 
pantheon, legitimating the veneration (sometimes forced) of the 
victors’ deity over others.
Animism—the belief that spirits inhabit natural items, leading to 
attempts to appease the spirits or gods related to one’s interest in 
order to receive favors. Totemism often results within animism, 
as elements within a culture lead to the representation of values 
in ways serving the inculcation of norms within a society—
characteristically projections of human values and aspirations 
understood in sociological terms.
Pantheism—the belief that all of nature and all of God are one. 
Therefore, God is not a personal being, nor is God transcendent; 
rather, God consists of “the whole show”—the sum of the 
parts of the natural cosmos. Such a view leads to moral realism, 
considering outcomes rather than principles as decisive in ethical 
considerations.
Panentheism—the belief that the reality of God includes the 
natural order but also extends beyond it. Therefore, God is at 
work through the natural world but is not distanced from it, 
although God’s existence and activity also transcend it.
Deism—the belief that God exists, but as an impersonal force 
rather than a personal being involved directly in the direction 
of the natural order. God is known through reason and the 
observation of nature, not through revelation and divine 
disclosure. Like a divine clock-maker, God has “wound up” the 
universe, which runs according to natural laws and patterns; 
God’s truths are self-evident.
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Skepticism—a stance of defaulting to doubt rather than belief, 
proof is required before a tenet is accepted. Verification hinges 
upon empirical demonstrability as ascertained by the senses, 
leading to a preference for materialism over and against idealism. 
As God is invisible and inaudible, skeptics doubt claims of 
religious experience and appeals to revealed truth.
Logical Positivism—a reduction of truth to what is positively 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Characteristically, positivism 
limits claims of verification to that which is empirically or 
logically demonstrable; obversely, positivism limits claims of 
falsification to that which is demonstrably overturned. With 
relation to God’s existence, the primary question hinges upon 
where the burden of proof lies—proving or disproving the 
existence of God.
Naturalism—the limiting of reality to the natural order, 
explaining phenomena without appeals to divine action 
or disclosure. God, while not necessarily denied within 
methodological naturalism, is considered irrelevant to human 
endeavors, as reality is explicable on the basis of natural laws 
and cause-and-effect relationships. Then again, metaphysical 
naturalism sees the cosmos as a closed system independent of 
the need for God.
Materialism—the limiting of reality to the realm of physicality, 
therefore rejecting the reality of God on the basis that God is 
unseen and materially inaccessible. In tension with idealism, 
materialism assumes that the material is all that is and all that 
can be meaningfully engaged. Therefore, ideal and transcendent 
realities are disregarded in the quest for truth and meaning.
Scientism—the view that because of its robust operation and 
promise science holds the answer to everything, including 
the meaning of life and the origin of human existence. Often 
competing with religion as a primary source of authority in the 
modern era, the elevation of science to mythic levels of authority 
sometimes goes beyond what scientific inquiry can actually 
deliver, taking on the semblance of a new religious movement.
Atheism—the belief that God is not. As a result, the origin of the 
world must be explained alternatively, not as a factor of creation 
or design but as a factor of other processes emerging for no 
apparent reason. In its modest forms, atheism simply makes 
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no allowance for divinity, supranaturalism, or revelation. In its 
stronger forms, atheism challenges religious conventions and 
assumptions claiming to pose a superior alternative.
Nontheism—a softer form of atheism preferring secular 
alternatives to theism and corollary beliefs in God. While 
humanism also has strong Judeo-Christian underpinnings in 
western society, nontheists often appeal to humanist, secular, 
and naturalist approaches to issues. Nontheists tend to see 
God as irrelevant and problematic, and thus sidestep issues of 
religious faith overall.
Therefore, as Friends discuss theism and its alternatives, they should 
understand what is meant by terms and how they are discussed within 
different schools of thought. For instance, any critique of theism 
must first identify which sort or aspect of theism it is addressing, as 
well as what historic discussions of particular tenets have emerged. If 
one objects to deterministic theism, might open or process theism 
pose a way forward? If one operates largely within laws of naturalism, 
might panentheism still allow a view of God who works through the 
natural order but also beyond it? If evil or tragedy in the world calls 
for an explanation, what do we do with human goodness and apparent 
redemption as realities? Might a supposed “nontheist” actually be a 
deist or a natural theologian—still believing in God but assuming God 
works in more spiritual and revelatory ways than interventionist or 
mechanistic ways? As natural theology is an established and respected 
field of inquiry,12 a preference for naturalism does not require one to 
abandon theology or theism. One may do that, but it is naïve and 
uninformed to assume that such is the only choice. 
As Friends engage these enduring subjects, they should consider 
the strengths and weaknesses of all sides of issues and should be modest 
in their claims as well as plain in their articulation. As Martin Marty 
has affirmed, the best way forward in fruitful theological discussion is 
appreciating the strengths of the arguments one finally rejects while 
also being mindful of the weakness of the views one embraces. 
Problems With “quakers” believinG in “no God”
Given that some have begun to identify themselves publicly as 
“Nontheist Friends,” this creates severe problems for the larger Quaker 
movement, despite having several strengths as well as weaknesses.
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Among strengths, the first is that theological discussion is 
happening, and Friends are asking some really hard questions 
about important subjects. With Fager, this is a strength of a robust 
theological inquiry, although I would encourage those interested in 
this theological subject to read broadly and in conservative directions 
as well as liberal ones.13 I would pose a mirror-image opposite 
recommendation for theologically conservative Friends to read those 
outside their camps, as well. This is what it takes to do theology well. 
On the other hand, if the authentic quest for God is removed from 
theological inquiry, is the central struggle of theology itself lost? As 
Chuck Fager has well described the character of theology elsewhere, 
as being like Jacob’s struggle with the angel, if the reality of God is 
removed from the struggle, can there be any tension-filled (and thus 
adequate) theology?
A second strength is the energy that David Boulton, Os Cresson, 
and others have been putting into the discussions; such is impressive 
by any measure. Of course, this would apply to any special interest 
among Friends, and perhaps Stoller’s pointing out that Quakers are 
indeed theists should lead to a “Theistic Quakers” special-interest 
group as a means of recovering a diminished feature of Quaker 
faith and practice. Then again, that may be redundant, as Quakers, 
historically and internationally, have sought to live receptively and 
responsively to God—a form of dynamic theism. If liberal Quakers 
become nontheistic, will they tolerate meetings of theistic Friends 
in their midst, or will they exclude or shame them for their lack of 
doubt? Doubtless, that could happen.
A third strength is the emphasis on the “fruits” of whatever comes 
from believing in No God. On one hand, the point is well taken, and 
the impressive Quaker credentials of contributors to the book make 
a strong statement as to their standing within the Society of Friends. 
On the other hand, if “works” also imply letting one’s “yes” be yes 
and one’s “no” be no, how can leading Quakers affirm the convictions 
of their communities of faith if they declare publicly that they do not 
believe in their affirmations of God? And, if good works pose the 
measure of value, have atheistic leaders been the most compelling of 
witnesses within the last century?14 Then again, Boulton’s citing of 
Mohamed Atta’s “faith in God” shows how problematic ill-defined 
theism can be.15 Indeed, God and the teachings/example of Jesus 
have been primary bases for the Quaker Peace Testimony, so without 
God as a principled basis it is doubtful that Quakers will long remain 
pacifists.16
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Despite its strengths, weaknesses with the movement are more 
pronounced in my view—at least if nontheists wish to maintain an 
explicitly Quaker identity. 
One weakness, as noted in the reviews, is that “Nontheist 
Quakerism” is a contradiction of terms. If the rise and progress of 
the people called Quakers has sought to diminish all else (speculative 
theologizing, cultic formalism, dead religiosity) in the interest of 
encountering the Living God experientially, the denial of such as a 
reality, or even as a possibility, means one rejects historic Quakerism. 
Conversely, if one believes in God and seeks to know God, even if 
the Ground and Source of our Being continues to be a mystery that 
defies human understanding, one cannot rightly call oneself an atheist 
or a nontheist. This is not a matter of some people excluding others; 
it is a factor of attempting to embrace mutually exclusive realities 
simultaneously.
A second weakness with the movement overall is that it sometimes 
comes across as intellectually naïve and somewhat superficial. The 
existence of God is a rich and varied subject of inquiry, and particular 
types of theism, as well as their alternatives, have intensive and extensive 
histories of intellectual engagement. Therefore, understanding the 
meanings of terms and the rich theological literature within particular 
schools of thought, before accepting or rejecting a doctrine, is basic 
to adequate inquiry. Further, virtually all academic theologians today 
think critically about God and how God is known and understood, 
and virtually all biblical scholars today operate naturalistically dealing 
with the facts of texts, cultures, and the histories of ideas. That, of 
course, creates other problems, but approaching God and the Bible 
rationally and critically, without appealing to supranatural factors, 
is basic to these disciplines and unexceptional. This does not mean, 
though, that all theologians and Bible scholars are nontheists, though 
they operate disciplinarily in rational and analytical ways.
A third weakness is not intrinsic to the movement, but it is far too 
common to command respect. In several cases, religious authorities 
are yoked to the nontheist cause inappropriately—either haphazardly 
or dishonestly. I don’t think Boulton’s citing of the great Christian 
mystic as basis for the title and thrust of his nontheistic book reflects 
intellectual dishonesty; I just doubt that he (or Don Cupitt, perhaps) 
has really thought about how Eckhart was dealing with St. Paul’s 
own theological-communal struggles in Romans 9. I also don’t know 
that all the Quaker luminaries cited by Os Cresson in his online 
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essays17 deserve to be linked too closely with nontheism. While 
Cresson correctly acknowledges that not all of the people mentioned 
were nontheistic (indeed, very few of them were) their questioning 
skepticism in ages past does not link them necessarily with nontheistic 
views today. All nontheists might be liberal, but not all liberals are (or 
were) nontheists. This is especially the case with Cresson’s presentation 
of Henry J. Cadbury as an atheist or a nontheist.18 
Despite Cresson’s frequent quoting of Cadbury’s claim to being 
“no ardent theist or atheist” as proof that he was a nontheist, Cadbury 
was not denying being a theist in that statement. He was simply 
distinguishing his personal religion from ways he taught his Bible 
courses at Harvard Divinity School and elsewhere. The responsibility 
of a biblical instructor within an academic setting is to discover the 
plain and clear meaning of the text rather than imposing one’s personal 
beliefs, letting the text speak for itself—problematic or otherwise. 
Bible teachers call this “exegesis” (digging out the best meaning 
of the text) rather than “eisegesis” (inserting one’s beliefs into the 
text).19 While Cadbury was wonderfully understated in describing 
his religious beliefs and experience,20 claiming also to be neither a 
literalist nor a mystic, this does not mean that he did not see himself 
as a deeply committed Christian who believed in God.21 
As a logical positivist, he challenged the certainty of all claims, and I 
believe he also would have challenged the certainty of nontheist claims 
as well as conservative ones. As he never claimed to be a nontheist, 
his name should not be associated with “Nontheist Friends” directly 
and in the name of intellectual integrity should be removed from 
websites and other sources claiming such. Cadbury also claimed he 
was no…atheist. As David Boulton and others would affirm, though, 
he did point to Woolman as the model of his religious faithfulness—
caring less about doctrinal definitions and deity references than deity-
faithfulness (or God’s love) in action. Woolman, however, did not 
believe his divine errands were merely of human origin, which is why 
they carried their moral and prophetic weight—a direct factor of their 
originative thrust. If Woolman had not believed in a Loving God—the 
Source of love and justice—would he have taken up his prophetic 
challenge to injustice in the same world-changing way? I doubt it.
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conclusion
While multiple varieties of theism have their problems, I’m not sure 
that belief in No God is an improvement. Without a personal, loving, 
and just Ground and Source of our Being directing self-centered 
humans to be other-centered and self-effacing—at times directively 
and empoweringly so—humans cannot love others, even as they might 
like to. While people do tend to “make God in their own image,” as 
Boulton and others well remind us, it is also true that seeing ourselves 
as made in the divine image—that of One who acts redemptively in 
history, and who came to earth in the flesh, embodying God’s self-
giving love in his life and death—calls us to live sacrificially, graciously, 
and lovingly because its character is a scandalizing affront to the 
seductive empire of the individual. As Elton Trueblood so often said, a 
cut-flower society can last for a while, but without being connected to 
its theocentric roots, it will soon wither and die. Phenomenologically, 
how does second- and third-generation atheism tend to fare? Belief 
in No God has the same theological challenges as belief in God; the 
question is how those difficulties will be navigated theologically, 
experientially, and ethically by newfound adherents.
But what about “Quaker Nontheists” as an organization or a 
movement; is it a good thing or not? Well, any time people can be 
inspired to ask hard questions and seek the truth rigorously, this is 
good. The question is how to do so in ways that do not deny local 
and covenantal Quaker communities. If one is a hard atheist (or even 
a strong nontheist) this is problematic if seeking God and following 
God are important to one’s Quaker affiliations. Questioning is one 
thing, but declaring publicly one’s belief in No God and commitment 
to challenging the beliefs and experiences of any and all who embrace 
a Divine Being—in theory or in praxis—excludes all people of earnest 
faith, which is not very “Quakerly.” 
How will committed nontheists speak to “that of No God” within 
every person? How will nontheists embrace any who have felt the 
healing salve of the Divine Embrace? How will “nontheist Friends” 
regard the history of the People Called Quakers, who, with Isaac 
Penington, were guided by the Light of Christ, the Seed of God, and 
the Power of the Holy Spirit working within the conscience of the 
individual? People are welcome to regard all who are given to a God 
beyond themselves as deluded, as atheists and some nontheists do, 
but in doing so, they exclude all committed members of the Society 
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of Friends—past, present, and future (if there is a future)—from their 
fellowship. 
If Quakers seek to be nontheists, though, they should commit 
themselves to seeking the truth well and with integrity, as Quakers have 
characteristically done, even if holding open the possibility of God’s 
existence. Or, they could say, “others may, but I cannot,” without 
judging those who, unlike them, have encountered God (as did the 
Quaker former “skeptic” John Wilhelm Rowntree), believe in God, 
and are seekers of God. They will need to seek truth with rigor and 
inclusivity, reading conservative material as well as liberal material—
weighing strengths and weaknesses of arguments fairly and with 
discerning judgment. They will need to speak with modesty of claim—
not making overreaching statements about messianic implications of 
believing in No God, and certainly resisting the misrepresentative 
yoking of respected authorities to their cause when those same 
religious leaders would not likely claim to believe in No God. They 
will need to keep true to the commands of Jesus to love neighbors, 
enemies, and one another, even if they cannot commit themselves to 
loving a non-existing God, and even though they reject an ontological 
basis (God’s love for us) for doing so. If such commitments, however, 
become onerous as encumbrances, or against the currents of atheism/
nontheism overall, they might consider dropping the “Quaker” part 
of the association, as Quakers have historically prioritized receptivity 
and responsiveness to the Living God above all else. 
Is “Nontheist Quakerism” a contradiction of terms? Perhaps 
not, if questioning theism is a factor of seeking the truth, whether 
it confirms or counters one’s understandings of the Deity. That 
simply means that one has become (goodness!) a Quaker theologian. 
If, however, one commits to atheism or nontheism, against their 
yearly meeting’s faith and practice and against the historic and global 
Quaker movements, that seems incompatible with Quaker integrity. 
So, emerging nontheists are welcome to wear their Quakerism as an 
ornamental trapping “as long as they canst,” but eventually they will 
have to choose between a faith and practice rooted in knowing and 
following God and a declared belief in No God.
After all, taking leave of “god” (theology) for God’s sake (and 
God’s truth) is one thing; taking leave of the Living God due to 
theological perplexities over what is meant by “god” is another.
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